UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-7-2019

Matney v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 45672

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported

Recommended Citation
"Matney v. State Appellant's Reply Brief Dckt. 45672" (2019). Not Reported. 4991.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/4991

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator
of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

Electronically Filed
2/7/2019 1:02 PM
Idaho Supreme Court
Karel Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
By: Brad Thies, Deputy Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

ANTHONY MICHAEL
MATNEY,

)
)
)
NO. 45672
Petitioner-Appellant,
)
v.
)
CANYON COUNTY NO. CV-2016-12517
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF
)
Respondent.
)
______________________________)
________________________
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
________________________
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF CANYON
________________________
HONORABLE GENE A. PETTY
District Judge
________________________
ERIC D. FREDERICKSEN
State Appellate Public Defender
I.S.B. #6555
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. #6247
322 E. Front Street, Suite 570
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: (208) 334-2712
Fax: (208) 334-2985
E-mail: documents@sapd.state.id.us
ATTORNEYS FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLANT

KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
(208) 334-4534

ATTORNEY FOR
RESPONDENT

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................................... ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ....................................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ............................................................................................... 1
Statement of the Facts and
Course of Proceedings ......................................................................................... 1
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL ................................................................................ 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................. 3
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Matney’s
Claim 9(k), Where The Basis For Dismissal Was That Mr. Matney
Had Failed To Prove His Claim ................................................................................. 3
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... 7
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ........................................................................................ 8

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599 (2009) ......................................................................................5
Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517 (2010)............................................................................................6
Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710 (2007) ......................................................................................3
State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271 (2017) ................................................................ 3, 4, 5
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ...........................................................................3

Statutes
I.C. § 19-4906 .............................................................................................................................5

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Anthony Matney appeals from the judgment summarily dismissing his petition for postconviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The factual and procedural histories of this case were previously detailed in Mr. Matney’s
Appellant’s Brief and, therefore, are not repeated herein.

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Matney’s Claim 9(k), where the basis for
dismissal was that Mr. Matney had failed to prove his claim?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing Mr. Matney’s Claim 9(k), Where The Basis
For Dismissal Was That Mr. Matney Had Failed To Prove His Claim
Mr. Matney contends that in summarily dismissing Claim 9(k) because he failed to prove
that ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the district court erred. As detailed in Mr. Matney’s
Appellant’s Brief, he was not required to prove the two-pronged Strickland1 standard for
ineffective assistance of counsel in order to survive summary dismissal. In fact, he was not
required to prove anything at the summary dismissal stage.
In response, the State seems to concede that Mr. Matney was not required to prove Claim
9(k)—his claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel insofar as his counsel
incorrectly advised him that withdrawal of his guilty plea prior to sentencing “is absolutely not
allowed”—as he need only have properly pled it and raised a genuine issue of material fact as to
each of the prongs of the ineffectiveness standard. (See Resp. Br., pp.7, 14-15.) The State also
explicitly concedes that Mr. Matney pled “a prima facie case” of the first prong—“that his trial
counsel provided deficient performance.”

(Resp. Br., p.8.)

However, the State argues

Claim 9(k) was properly dismissed because Mr. Matney failed to plead the second prong—
prejudice. (Resp. Br., pp.6-15.)
Whatever merit the State’s argument might otherwise have, that argument is not
appropriate for this Court’s consideration, as it is being made for the first time on appeal, and
without the statutorily-required prior notice.
It has long been recognized in Idaho that “appellate review is limited to the evidence,
theories and arguments that were presented below.” State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271,
274-76 (2017) (quoting Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 714 (2007)). And it is now clear that
1

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (requiring a showing of both deficient
performance, and prejudice, in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel).
3

this standard “applies to all parties on appeal.” Id. at 276. Below, the State never argued that
Claim 9(k) was subject to dismissal for any alleged failure to plead prejudice. Rather, in its
motion for summary dismissal, the State argued Claim 9(k) should be dismissed because it failed
on its merits because Mr. Matney had personally consented to the withdrawal of his motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas. (R., pp.125-26.) The entirety of the State’s argument was as follows:
In the same light as the paragraph above [ineffective assistance of
counsel], Petitioner attacks his ability to withdraw his guilty plea. Contained
within the Sentencing Transcript at pages 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, the issue of
Petitioner withdrawing his guilty plea was brought up. At no time did Petitioner
indicate that he was being forced to withdraw his request to set aside the guilty
plea or take issue with the sentencing going forward. In fact, Petitioner discussed
the matter with the Court and decided to withdraw the request to set aside the
guilty plea. “If you need further clarification and explanation, you can have time
to do that. Defendant: No. Let’s just go ahead and proceed.”
(R., pp.125-26 (quoting the sentencing transcript at p.10, Ls.9-12).)2 This argument appears to
have been that, because Mr. Matney acted on the erroneous advice of his counsel, counsel’s
erroneous advice could not have constituted ineffective assistance—an attack on the merits of his
claim, not on the adequacy of Mr. Matney’s pleadings. 3
Later, at the summary dismissal hearing, the State reiterated essentially the same
argument:

2

This portion of the sentencing transcript appears at page 77 of the Clerk’s Record.
In its brief, the State attempts to make it seem as if it has only ever argued that Mr. Matney
inadequately pled Claim 9(k). First, it points out that it “argued that Matney’s factual assertions
were conclusory and did not establish a prima facie case as to any of his claims.” (Resp.
Br., p.3.) However, in support of this claim, the State cites introductory language at the outset of
its “Argument” section in its motion to dismiss, which was not necessarily directed at Claim
9(k). (See R., p.123.) Claim 9(k) was specifically addressed two pages later, where the State
proffered the argument quoted above. (See R., pp.125-26.) Second, citing the portion of its
motion wherein it specifically addressed Claim 9(k), the State attempts to characterize its
argument in the district court as an attack on the adequacy of Mr. Matney’s pleading: “[T]he
State asserted[ ] Matney failed to allege facts demonstrating he was prejudiced by any deficient
trial counsel performance.” (Resp. Br., p.3 (citing R., pp.125-26).) However, the plain language
of the State’s argument below—focusing solely on the merits of Mr. Matney’s claim—belies the
State’s current attempt to characterize it as an attack on the adequacy of his pleadings.
3

4

If it is being considered in the ineffective assistance of counsel argument,
there was the specific inquiry by the trial judge, you know, “Do you want to
withdraw your guilty plea?” And then Mr. Matney indicates, “No. Let’s go
ahead and proceed.”[4]
So the State or respondent in this case is left with trying to utilize a record
where the defendant in the criminal case, or the petitioner, has—has responded to
specific inquiries from the court about pleading, about withdrawing, more
importantly specifically gave consideration about withdrawing that plea, and he
said no. And now we have this allegation that, oh, I couldn’t have—couldn’t
have withdrawn it.[5]
And so I believe that there is ample evidence from this record that
Mr. Matney exercised his independent decision-making at that time to proceed
with the case.
(Tr., p.4, Ls.6-21.) So again, the State’s argument went to the merits of Mr. Matney’s claim, not
the adequacy of his pleading. Because the State never argued below that Claim 9(k) should be
dismissed based on an alleged failure to adequately plead prejudice, the State is prohibited from
making such an argument in this appeal. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho at 274-76.
Further, even if the State’s new argument were not barred by Garcia-Rodriguez, it would
be an improper basis for relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (“UPCPA”).
Under the UPCPA, summary dismissal is only permitted where the petitioner has been given
prior notice of the ultimate reason(s) for dismissal. See I.C. § 19-4906(b) (providing that a court
may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief sua sponte, but only after giving the
petitioner notice of “its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for doing so” and at
least 20 days to respond to that notice); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601 (2009)
(recognizing that under I.C. § 19-4906(c) a court may also summarily dismiss a petition for postconviction relief in response to a party’s motion, but holding that any such motion must give
4

This is not a verbatim quote of the proceedings. It appears that the prosecutor’s argument
combined portions of pages 7 and 10 of the sentencing hearing transcript. (See R., pp.76-77.)
5
This was a misrepresentation of Mr. Matney’s claim. He did not allege that he could not have
withdrawn his guilty pleas; he alleged that his attorney told him he could not withdraw his guilty
pleas. (R., p.8.)
5

specific notice of the reasons for dismissal). Here, because the State’s motion only argued the
merits of Claim 9(k) (see R., pp.125-26), and because the district court did not give notice of its
intent to dismiss sua sponte (see generally R.), Mr. Matney has never received any notice that
Claim 9(k) was subject to dismissal for allegedly failing to adequately plead prejudice, and it
would be improper for this Court to affirm the district court’s dismissal on that basis.
Cf. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 523 (2010) (“[W]here a trial court dismisses a claim based
upon grounds other than those offered—by the State’s motion for summary dismissal, and
accompanying memoranda—the defendant seeking post-conviction relief must be provided with
a 20–day notice period.”).
Had Mr. Matney been given proper, timely notice that Claim 9(k) may have been
deficient for its failure to plead prejudice, he undoubtedly could have remedied the alleged defect
in the district court. The claim itself quite clearly alleged that Mr. Matney withdrew his motion
to withdraw his guilty plea based on the erroneous advisement of his counsel. (See R., p.8.) The
obvious inference to be drawn from this allegation is that, had his counsel not mis-advised him,
he would not have withdrawn his motion, and would have continued pursuing his attempt to
withdraw his guilty plea. Amending the petition to add an allegation to this effect would have
been a simple matter, but it never happened because Mr. Matney was never given notice of the
need to do so.
Because the State’s new argument on appeal—that Mr. Matney’s petition was properly
dismissed based on his failure to plead prejudice in Claim 9(k)—is not properly before this Court
because it was never made (by either the State or the district court) below, it should be
disregarded. The real question in this case is whether the district court erred in dismissing
Mr. Matney’s petition when, instead of applying the required summary dismissal standard

6

(asking whether there was a genuine issue of material fact), it held Mr. Matney to a standard of
having to prove his claims. However, on this point, the State has very little to say. (See
Resp. Br., pp.14-15.)

The State simply dismisses the district court’s words as “imprecise

language,” and argues the district court’s ruling was “broad enough” to encompass the proper
standard—essentially asking this Court to substitute what the district court should have said, for
that which it did say. (See Resp. Br., pp.14-15.) However, Mr. Matney asks that this Court
consider what the district court actually said. When the district court’s ruling (see R., pp.154-57)
is taken at face value, it is readily apparent that the district court evaluated whether Mr. Matney
had proved his claim. (See App. Br., pp.9-14.) As such, the district court applied the wrong
legal standard.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, and in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. Matney respectfully
requests that this Court vacate the district court’s judgment and its summary dismissal order, and
that it remand this case to the district court for an evidentiary hearing on Claim 9(k).
DATED this 7th day of February, 2019.

/s/ Erik R. Lehtinen
ERIK R. LEHTINEN
Chief, Appellate Unit
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